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ABSTRACT
The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) has been used for decades as
the de facto protocol to exchange reachability information among
networks in the Internet. However, little is known about how this
protocol is used to restrict reachability to selected destinations, e.g.,
that are under attack. While such a feature, BGP blackholing, has
been available for some time, we lack a systematic study of its
Internet-wide adoption, practices, and network e￿cacy, as well as
the pro￿le of blackholed destinations.
In this paper, we develop and evaluate a methodology to auto-
matically detect BGP blackholing activity in the wild. We apply
our method to both public and private BGP datasets. We ￿nd that
hundreds of networks, including large transit providers, as well as
about 50 Internet exchange points (IXPs) o￿er blackholing service
to their customers, peers, and members. Between 2014–2017, the
number of blackholed pre￿xes increased by a factor of 6, peaking
at 5K concurrently blackholed pre￿xes by up to 400 Autonomous
Systems. We assess the e￿ect of blackholing on the data plane using
both targeted active measurements as well as passive datasets, ￿nd-
ing that blackholing is indeed highly e￿ective in dropping tra￿c
before it reaches its destination, though it also discards legitimate
tra￿c. We augment our ￿ndings with an analysis of the target IP
addresses of blackholing. Our tools and insights are relevant for
operators considering o￿ering or using BGP blackholing services
as well as for researchers studying DDoS mitigation in the Internet.
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1 INTRODUCTION
Access to online information, content, services, and social commu-
nities has fueled the phenomenal growth of the Internet for decades.
To enable such access global reachability is imperative [18, 40], i.e.,
every publicly advertised address should be reachable from any
device connected to the Internet. The de facto protocol to achieve
global reachability in the Internet is the Border Gateway Protocol
(BGP) [62]. BGP enables autonomously operated networks to ex-
change reachability information with their immediate peers and,
eventually, with all the networks in the Internet. Because the In-
ternet is an uncoordinated global communication system [19], it
took a substantial e￿ort to achieve stable global connectivity in
the face of outages [8, 33] and disasters [15], independent routing
decisions [30, 46, 47], network attacks [52, 70], miscon￿gurations,
and security loopholes [36].
Today’s network challenges go beyond global connectivity. Dis-
tributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks have increased both in
terms of attack bandwidth and numbers of compromisedmachines [1].
The pro￿le of attackers ranges from hackers that try to gain com-
mercial bene￿ts [51], activists that try to protest (“Hacktivism”),
e.g., by attacking banks [22] and government Web sites [23], to
regimes that attack the network infrastructure of political oppo-
nents [6] or neighboring countries [65]. Many high pro￿le sites pay
for sophisticated defense mechanisms such as tra￿c-scrubbing [39]
(which ￿lters attack tra￿c from legitimate tra￿c) and ￿rewalls [13].
Many content providers use content delivery networks which o￿er
sophisticated security services and are able to absorb large DDoS
attacks due to the size and scope of their infrastructure [31, 53].
Operators can have signi￿cant di￿culties handling DDoS attacks.
They may have to transport voluminous attack tra￿c to mitiga-
tion middleboxes or to the targeted server, only to have the tra￿c
dropped or for it to create harm. The larger the DDoS attack volume,
the higher the cost for the network operator, including transit costs
with upstream providers, or transgression of peering agreements.
High volume attacks also impede on the service quality of the le-
gitimate tra￿c. Such degradation may harm the service provider’s
reputation or lead to violations of service level agreements.
One mitigation option is blackholing, i.e., dropping tra￿c, to a
destination, ideally as close to the source as possible. While ag-
gressive, blackholing has the potential to be fast, cheap, and very
e￿ective, especially when the attack volume is very high such that
alternative mitigation options become more di￿cult or expensive.
Blackholing drops all tra￿c to a targeted DoS destination, not just
the attack tra￿c, and can have the drawback that this destination
becomes unreachable – the goal of the DDoS attack. Also, if the
target organization has purchased a tra￿c-scrubbing service, then
this service is degraded if the tra￿c is discarded prior to reaching
the scrubbing center. Hence there is a con￿ict of interest between
organizations that use such services, and intermediate networks
through which the tra￿c would traverse. Such negative impact is
less severe if (much of) the attack tra￿c originates from only a
few locations and blackholing can be limited to a small set of asso-
ciated providers, hence not a￿ecting legitimate tra￿c from other
origins. We note that blackholing is not limited to DDoS mitigation,
but can also be used to restrict reachability for other reasons, e.g.,
censorship, compliance with regulations, or court decisions.
BGP enables blackholing by leveraging the BGP communities
attribute (RFC 1997 [11]). Networks trigger blackholing requests by
sending BGP announcements to their BGP neighbors for speci￿c
destination pre￿xes with the appropriate blackhole community.
The neighbor, upon receiving such an announcement, discards at
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its ingress tra￿c whose destination address is in the blackholed
pre￿x. Internet exchange points (IXPs) also o￿er blackholing as a
service to their members [12, 25]. Although BGP blackholing has
been available for some time, little is known about its adoption
and e￿ectiveness. One complication is that BGP community val-
ues, in general as well as for blackholing, are not standardized, as
underlined in an earlier study of BGP communities (for the period
2004 to 2007) [26]. The authors could extract the semantic meaning
for only 22% of BGP communities tags in BGP updates from RIPE
and RouteViews route collectors. Of these, only 60 (0.2%) appeared
to be related to BGP blackholing. Yet, we know from two prior
studies that today BGP-based blackholing services are deployed in
the Internet and, in principle, perform as desired. Orsini et al. [54]
used blackholing as a case study to highlight the capabilities of
BGPstream. They showed that BGPStream provides timely parsing
capabilities to capture blackholing events in a set of 30 networks
observed at two BGP collectors. Dietzel et al. [25] studied the pop-
ularity of the blackholing service o￿ered by a single IXP.
The present paper builds upon this prior work and extends it to
systematically assess: (i) the Internet-wide adoption of BGP black-
holing by di￿erent types of network operators over the last years,
(ii) current blackholing practices, (iii) the network e￿cacy of BGP
blackholing, i.e., how much prior to the destination the tra￿c is
dropped, and (iv) the pro￿le of destinations targeted by blackholing.
Our contributions and ￿ndings can be summarized as follows:
• We develop and evaluate a methodology to automatically detect
blackholed pre￿xes in the Internet. We use a number of public
and private BGP datasets to assess the visibility of Internet-wide
BGP blackholing activity over more than two years (2014-2017).
• We ￿nd that an increasing number of networks of di￿erent types
o￿er BGP blackholing services to their customers and peers. We
identify more than 250 transit, access, and content providers as
well as about 50 IXPs around the globe. Moreover, blackholing
usage is increasing. Over the last three years the number of
blackholed pre￿xes has increased by a factor of 6, peaking up to
5K concurrently blackholed pre￿xes by up to 400 Autonomous
Systems per day, in recent months.
• We show that BGP blackholing activity can potentially serve as a
proxy for identifying high pro￿le attacks in the Internet. Indeed,
increased activity of BGP blackholing correlates with periods of
high activity of DDoS attacks.
• We assess the e￿ect of blackholing on the data plane using both
targeted active measurements as well as passive datasets, ￿nding
that blackholing is in fact highly e￿ective in dropping tra￿c
before it reaches its destination.
• We pro￿le blackholed destinations and ￿nd that the most popular
blackholed pre￿xes of the more than 88K pre￿xes during the last
eight months involve content providers. This has implications
on the reputation of such networks and for unrelated services
that happen to use the same IP.
Our study provides insights to operators, regulators, and re-
searchers. Our evaluation of the deployed BGP blackholing service
is of interest to network operators that (i) consider o￿ering BGP
blackholing services, or (ii) consider using the o￿ered BGP black-
holing service. For regulators, it is important to observe which IP
pre￿xes are not reachable (blackholed) and why. An Internet-wide
inference of the BGP blackholing activity either online or based
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Figure 1: Blackholing: Triggering via BGP and e￿ect on the
data plane.
on archived data sheds light on the current trends and can inform
policy decisions and best practices. In summary, this study provides
the tools and a ￿rst analysis of Internet-wide BGP blackholing.
2 BACKGROUND AND DEFINITIONS
Blackholing is a popular DDoS mitigation strategy inside a single
network or among multiple networks. Hereby, the victim network
(AS) announces the attacked destination IP or pre￿x to its upstream
via BGP, also known as remotely triggered blackholing [16]. The up-
stream AS can then drop tra￿c towards this pre￿x, the blackholed
pre￿x, usually at the AS ingress point by rewriting the next-hop
address to a null interface. To distinguish regular routing updates
from blackholing messages, ASes tag such route updates with a
blackhole community, which is typically documented in the Internet
Routing Registry (IRR) record of the network operator or on the
network provider’s web page. The blackholed pre￿x is the destina-
tion pre￿x in BGP announcements that is tagged with a blackhole
community.
A Blackholing provider is a network that o￿ers the BGP blackhol-
ing service. It is also the network that speci￿es which community
to use for BGP blackholing, see Figure 1(a). Historically, blackholing
was implemented mainly at the network edge (customer or provider
networks). However, over time it has moved to the Internet core,
and is now o￿ered by Internet Service Providers (ISPs) and IXPs as
well. In recent years, an increasing number of IXPs o￿er blackholing
as a free service to their users [12]. At IXPs the connected IXP mem-
bers often take advantage of the IXP route server for ease of peering
via the joined layer-2 infrastructure [58]. If a member establishes
a session with the IXP route server, it can announce a pre￿x with
an appropriate blackhole community tag to the route server. The
route server then propagates the announcement to all connected
IXP member ASes that do not ￿lter such announcements, see Fig-
ure 1(b). These ASes can then drop tra￿c towards the blackholed
pre￿x to the null interface speci￿ed by the IXP. The Blackholing IP
is the address to which the next-hop of the blackholed pre￿x is set
in order for the tra￿c to be dropped, e￿ectively a null interface.
A Blackholing user is a network that makes use of the BGP
blackholing service, i.e., the network that inserts the blackhole
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community tag in the BGP announcement, o￿ered by a blackholing
provider. In the case that the blackholing provider is a peer or an
upstream provider, the announcement for the blackholed pre￿x
has to be announced with the associated blackhole community as
shown in Figure 1(a). If an IXP is the blackholing provider, the user
has to announce the blackholed pre￿x to the route server with the
IXP blackhole community as shown in Figure 1(b).
While blackholing essentially takes the victim destination of-
￿ine, it prevents saturation and collateral damage in the network
resources along the attack path. Therefore, it is bene￿cial for both
the destination network aswell as the upstreamASes, at the expense
of the target of the attack. According to the recommended best prac-
tices, operators do not accept BGP routes for pre￿xes more-speci￿c
than /24, in order to prevent routing table deaggregation [49]. How-
ever, in the case of BGP blackholing, /24 or less-speci￿c pre￿xes to
mitigate a DDoS attack on speci￿c hosts would lead to blackholing
of all the hosts in the pre￿x, even those not a￿ected by the attack.
To restrict the impact of blackholing, blackholing providers accept
routes more-speci￿c than /24, if they are tagged with a blackholing
community. Contrarily, and according to the best practice, pre￿xes
less-speci￿c than /24 should not be allowed to be blackholed [45]. A
common practice by blackholing providers is to require some type
of authentication to accept the blackhole community. Typically,
they will accept a blackhole community if the request comes from
the originator of the pre￿x or from a network provider that has this
pre￿x in its customer cone. Some of the blackholing providers will
accept announcements only via secure BGP using the RPKI [37] and
others will accept blackholing announcements only if the pre￿x is
registered in one of the IRRs.
3 BGP DATASETS
In this section we provide an overview of the BGP datasets that
we analyze in this study. A summary of statistics per BGP dataset
(for March 2017) is presented in Table 1. Note that we report on the
total number of pre￿xes, however, over 96% of the pre￿xes across
the datasets are IPv4. For our analysis we also rely on non-BGP
data, which we introduce in the appropriate sections.
Public BGP Data:We analyze widely-used public datasets from
the route collectors of the (i) RIPE Routing Information Service
(RIS) [60], (ii) Route Views (RV) [69], and (iii) Packet Clearing House
(PCH) [55]. All of these platforms consist of several routers that col-
lect default-free BGP routing information from a multitude of BGP
peers. Some BGP peers send full routing tables, others partial views,
and even others only their customer routes. The platforms then pub-
licly o￿er full BGP routing updates. Many IXPs o￿er route servers
as a free value-added service to simplify BGP session management
for their members. Route servers collect routing information at the
IXP in a centralized manner and redistribute them to connected
member routers. As such, they o￿er BGP routing information for
most of the IXP members [58]. PCH maintains route collectors at
111 di￿erent IXPs (March 2017) [56] and makes the data available.
Private BGP Data:While the above datasets cover a signi￿cant
part of the Internet, their scope is biased by where the collectors
are placed, which networks participate, e.g., RIS and RV are biased
to what is announced by large transit providers in the core of In-
ternet [62], and if a direct peering feed via BGP is available. To
Source #IP
peers
#AS
peers
#Unique
AS peers
#Pre￿xes #Unique
pre￿xes
RIS 425 313 77 712,176 11,876
RV 269 197 42 784,700 87,536
PCH 8,897 1,721 1,175 765,005 38,847
CDN 3,349 1,282 911 1,840,321 1,055,196
Total 12,940 2,798 2,205 2,012,404 1,193,455
Table 1: Overview of BGP dataset for March 2017. IPv4 pre-
￿xes account for 96.64% of the total pre￿xes.
overcome some of these limitations we augment the publicly avail-
able datasets with BGP updates from a large CDN which receives
BGP feeds from about 3,350 BGP peers in about 1,300 networks.
The CDN BGP dataset is unique because the CDN collectors also
receive customer-speci￿c and internal BGP announcements as the
CDN deploys network equipment within many ISPs. This unique
view of the CDN is the reason why it receives multiple times more
unique pre￿xes than the collectors of the public datasets. Note that
the CDN itself does not o￿er a BGP blackholing service.
Looking Glasses:We use the Periscope system [32] that gives
us access to about 150 BGP looking glasses. Out of them, 30 looking
glasses either enable queries for full BGP table dumps or based
on community values. We mainly use the looking glass data for
validation for those ASes where we do not have a direct peering
feed via a BGP collector or to query for a speci￿c pre￿x/IP.
BGPData Cleaning: To eliminate obvious miscon￿gurations in
the BGP data we ￿lter out non-routable, private, and bogon pre￿xes
(archived weekly snapshots) that are reported in the Cymru bogon
list [21], and eliminate pre￿xes less-speci￿c than /8.
4 METHODOLOGY
Next, we present our methodology for inferring ISP and IXP BGP
blackholing activity in the Internet. The key observation is that
BGP announcements are used to restrict reachability if they are
tagged with speci￿c communities. Thus, we ￿rst outline how to
build a blackhole communities dictionary. Then, we describe our
inference methodology in detail.
4.1 Blackhole Communities Dictionary
No universally followed convention exists with regards to how
ASes use community values [26]. This a￿ects which community
values are used by each AS for signaling BGP blackholing. Thus, we
have to infer such information from various sources to construct a
blackhole communities dictionary.
Inferring Blackhole Communities: To gather lists of BGP
blackhole communities we use a similar methodology as was used
by Giotsas et al. [33] for extracting BGP location communities.
Since ISPs and IXPs o￿er blackholing as a service for their cus-
tomers/members, many of them use well-documented communities
and publish them either on their Web pages or in their Internet
Routing Registry (IRR) records (for our analysis we use the IRR
records in Merit RADb [50]). To gather this information we ￿rst
develop a Web scraper to collect the relevant text from ISP and IXP
Web pages as well as IRR records. Then, we apply natural language
processing techniques using the Natural Language ToolKit [7] text
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parser to extract all community values relevant for BGP blackhol-
ing by searching for lemmas of certain text patterns, and certain
keywords e.g., "blackhole", or "null route". In addition, we can some-
times collect meta-information about these blackhole communities,
e.g., the maximum accepted pre￿x length of blackhole communi-
ties, or region-speci￿c blackhole communities. The IRR records
contribute the largest fraction of blackhole communities to our
dictionary, namely 172 communities for 209 networks. For 93 other
ASes we found an additional 130 BGP communities on Web pages
that document their BGP policies. We collected additional BGP
blackhole communities for 5 networks via private communication.
Together this accounts for BGP blackhole communities for 307 ASes,
including 49 IXPs and 13 Tier-1 ISPs.
The most popular BGP community format is 32 bits, where
the ￿rst 16 bits refer to the ASN, as speci￿ed in RFC1997 [11].
More recent community formats, such as the extended [64] and
the large [38] communities, have been introduced to address issues
with 32-bit ASNs, but so far their adoption is limited. In our dictio-
nary, only 6 of the 307 networks have adopted the new community
format, and only 1 of these use it for blackholing purposes.
Typically, each blackholing provider only uses a single BGP com-
munity for global blackholing. However, there are several blackhol-
ing providers that use additional ones for more ￿ne grained control
over the scope of the blackholing, e.g., blackhole only in Europe,
US, or Asia. Thus, in some cases we have multiple blackhole com-
munities for one blackholing provider. Note, almost all blackholing
providers use the same community tags for IPv4 and IPv6. We take
all these peculiarities into account while constructing our BGP
blackhole community dictionary. The most common convention for
blackhole communities (51%) is to use the format ASN:666, where
ASN is the AS number of the AS of the blackholing provider. Other
popular values are ASN:66 and ASN:999. However, note that the
use of the value 666 in a community does not necessarily imply
blackholing, as 666 is also used by some ASes to encode other in-
formation, e.g., Level3 uses the community 3356:666 to tag peering
routes, and the community 3356:9999 for remotely triggered black-
holing. As a result we only include communities in our dictionary if
we can validate them either via published information by the ASes
or private communication, and we refer to them as documented
communities. We also see cases of blackhole communities where
the ￿rst 16 bits do not indicate a public ASN, e.g., 65536:666 or
0:666. From the documentation we found that multiple networks
share such BGP blackhole communities. Hence, we augment the
dictionary of documented communities with information about
which networks provide this community.
For the IXPs, we follow a similar approach. Most IXPs that o￿er
BGP blackholing publish their communities on their Web page or
IRR records, so that their members can easily access this informa-
tion. Among the 111 IXPs for which PCH has a BGP collector, we
are able to identify 26 IXPs worldwide that o￿er BGP blackholing
service. Using ourWeb scraper and natural language based analysis,
we discovered 23 additional IXPs with BGP blackholing service. The
most noticeable among these is MSK IXP, which has locations in
9 Russian cities. The large majority, 47 out of 49, follow the sug-
gestion of RFC 7999 [42] regarding the usage of the BGP blackhole
community value 65535:666. In almost all cases they also provide
a blackholing IP for IPv4 and IPv6. The most common last octet
Network Type #Networks #Blackhole communities
Transit/Access 198 (81) 223 (90)
IXP 49 (0) 2 (0)
Content 23 (14) 25 (14)
Education/Research/NfP 15 (1) 20 (1)
Enterprise 8 (3) 9 (3)
Unknown 14 (3) 4 (3)
TOTAL unique 307 (102) 292 (111)
Table 2: Documented blackholed communities distribution
used in our study (in parenthesis we report the inferred but
undocumented blackhole communities distribution).
for IPv4 is .66, while the most common string for IPv6 addresses is
dead:beef [sic].
Table 2 provides details on the documented communities per
network type. We group the networks that provide these commu-
nities according to their declared network type in the PeeringDB
database [57]. If the network does not maintain a PeeringDB record,
or does not disclose its network type, we use CAIDA’s AS classi￿ca-
tion dataset [9]. CAIDA’s classi￿cation combines the NSP (Network
Service Provider) and Cable/DSL/ISP types found in PeeringDB in
the Transit/Access class. To get a consistent classi￿cation we also fol-
low the same convention. The network types Educational/Research,
and NfP (Not-for-Pro￿t) are unique to PeeringDB’s classi￿cation.
The resulting dictionary contains documented community val-
ues for 307 ISPs and IXPs1, i.e., ￿ve times as many networks as
reported in 2008 in the most detailed study so far [26]. Indeed, our
method discovers blackhole communities for all networks included
in this prior study in an automated fashion. Since BGP blackhole
community values can change, we compare ours with the ones
from that study, which are publicly available. We ￿nd that 72% are
still active and none of the inactive ones have been re-purposed,
which indicates that the community usage is relatively stable over
time.
Possibilities for Extended Dictionary: The above process for
creating a BGP blackhole community dictionary is likely to miss
some BGP blackhole communities. One possible way for extending
the dictionary is to take advantage of the properties of blackholing
BGP updates. Indeed, prior work [25] pointed out that most IPv4
blackholing announcements are for /32s, while at the same time
host routes should not be part of the global routing tables. More-
over, it should be best practice to not accept blackholing for pre￿xes
less-speci￿c than /24. Thus, communities that are predominantly
associated with announcements for more-speci￿c pre￿xes than /24
are prime candidates for BGP blackhole communities. To con￿rm
this hypothesis we constructed a second dictionary of BGP com-
munities that includes communities for non-blackholing purposes
(i.e., relationship tagging, tra￿c engineering), by parsing again IRR
records and operator’s Web sites. We then compared the pre￿x
lengths on which the blackholing and non-blackhole communities
are applied.
In Figure 2 the axes are respectively a numbered list of the di￿er-
ent community tags, the pre￿x length in the BGP announcement in
which the community tag appeared, and on the z-axis, for a given
1Each ISP is identi￿ed by its ASN. Sibling ASes are counted as separate networks if
they use di￿erent ASNs.
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Figure 2: For a given community tag, the fraction of occur-
rences with the given pre￿x length.
community tag, the fraction of appearances with the given pre￿x
length. Figure 2 shows that the largest fraction of non-blackhole
communities are applied on /24 or less-speci￿c pre￿xes, and where
the vertical plane of red cross markers occurs at /24. On the other
hand, the blackhole communities in our dictionary (blue dot mark-
ers) are applied almost exclusively on /32 pre￿xes. We could use
this observation to extend the blackhole communities dictionary,
by collecting communities values which are exclusively applied on
pre￿xes more-speci￿c than /24. Moreover, to increase our con￿-
dence that these communities are indeed used for BGP blackholing,
we require them to be used together with other known blackhole
communities at least once. Many of the inferred communities also
follow the pattern ASN:666. We ignore communities for which the
￿rst 16 bits do not encode a public ASN since without documen-
tation it is not possible to map such communities to blackholing
providers. Overall, we found 111 such inferred communities in 102
ASes that are not present in the dictionary of the documented com-
munities. Since these communities are not documented, we decided
not to include them in the community dictionary.
4.2 BGP Blackholing Inference
To infer BGP blackholing activity, we identify related BGP an-
nouncements using the blackhole community dictionary from Sec-
tion 4.1 (with documented blackhole communities).We also perform
additional checks to eliminate false positives and collect useful data
to later characterize BGP blackholing activity.
Identifying Blackholed Pre￿xes in BGPDatasets: Each pre-
￿x that is tagged with a community from our blackhole community
dictionary is a potential candidate. However, before we conclude
that it is part of a blackholing event, we check if the blackhole
community can be used by multiple blackholing providers (with
di￿erent ASNs), e.g., 0:666. In the case of such ambiguous commu-
nities we further check if any potential ASN is on the AS path. If
it is not we do not consider the update any further. We infer the
blackholing user as the AS before the blackholing provider along
the AS path (after removing AS path prepending).
Whenwe encounter IXP blackholing communities, we ￿rst check
if the ASN of the IXP’s route server appears in the AS path, or if the
peer-ip attribute of the BGP message belongs to the address space
of the IXP’s peering LAN, according to PeeringDB. In these cases we
Figure 3: Detection of blackhole communities through pas-
sive BGP monitoring.
can con￿rm that the IXP is indeed traversed, and we infer the IXP as
the blackholing provider. If the route server ASN appears in the AS
path, we infer the AS hop before it as the blackholing user. When
we determine the IXP blackholing provider based on the peer-ip
attribute (in this case is the blackholing IP), the blackholing user
is inferred as the AS encoded in the peer-as attribute, which is
the IXP member that announces the blackholed pre￿x using the
corresponding IXP blackhole community.
Note that blackholing users often want to blackhole a pre￿x at
multiple providers. In this case they may either send a di￿erent pre-
￿x advertisement to each provider, with the blackhole community
of each respective blackhole community attached, or bundle the
blackhole communities together for all of the intended blackholing
providers, and send the same pre￿x advertisement to all of their
external BGP neighbors. In the case of such blackhole community
bundling, our methodology is able to detect blackholing requests
at providers, even if these providers are not forwarding the black-
holed pre￿x outside their network. Figure 3 illustrates this detection
process. Blackholing user ASC1 announces the blackholed pre￿x
Pre￿xB1 with di￿erent blackhole communities (IXP:666 and P1:666)
for each respective blackholing provider. In this case we can infer
only the IXP blackholing provider but not ASP1, since ASP1 does
not propagate the announcement to the BGP collector. On the other
hand, blackholing user ASC2 bundles the blackhole communities
P1:666 and P2:666 to pre￿x Pre￿xB2, even at BGP neighbors which
do not provide blackholing such as ASpeer . Even though neither
ASP1 nor ASP2 propagate the blackholed pre￿x to a collector, we
are able to infer the blackholing at both providers by getting the
BGP feed from ASpeer . We show in Section 9 that bundling con-
tributes about half of our inferences and helps us discover a large
number of blackholings, despite the inherent restrictions in the
propagation of blackholed pre￿xes (due to pre￿x lengths).
Initialization Based on BGP Table Dump: To initiate our
analysis we use the oldest BGP dump table from the BGP dataset. For
each pre￿x that can be identi￿ed as a blackhole pre￿x, we store: the
blackhole communities, the associated blackholing providers/IXPs,
BGP path, next hop, and the peer IP and ASN. At this point we
cannot accurately pinpoint the start time as we can only conclude
that the blackholing event started before the BGP dump was stored.
To account for this we use an initial starting time of zero. Once
we have initialized our inference we move into continuous moni-
toring mode by monitoring all BGP updates, which includes BGP
announcements as well as withdrawals.
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Continuous Monitoring of BGP Announcements:When a
BGP collector receives a new BGP announcement, we parse the
BGP communities attribute for possible blackhole values in the
same manner as during the initialization phase. We consider two
cases where we have to update our initial record of blackholed
pre￿xes:
• The announced pre￿x has blackhole communities attached and
it was not previously blackholed. In this case we consider the
BGP announcement the start of a new blackholing event for the
BGP peer that received the announcement, and we add the pre￿x
in the list of blackholed pre￿xes to monitor.
• The announced pre￿x has no blackhole communities attached,
but the pre￿x was previously observed as blackholed at that
particular BGP peer. In this case we infer an implicit withdrawal
of blackholing event at the time of the BGP announcement.
Note that a de-activation of a pre￿x blackholing may be observed
only at a subset of the BGP peers that observed the initial blackhol-
ing. Therefore, we track all blackholing events at the granularity of
individual BGP peers. Then, we correlate the observed activation
and de-activation for a given blackholed pre￿x across all the BGP
peers. We do this to decide on the exact starting and ending of a
blackholing activity for a given blackholed pre￿x.
Continuous Monitoring of BGP Withdrawals: To estimate
the end of a blackholing event for a blackholed pre￿x we also track
BGP withdrawals on a per BGP peer basis for each pre￿x. When-
ever we detect an explicit withdrawal of a previously blackholed
pre￿x, we mark the end of the blackholing event at the time of the
withdrawal message.
5 BGP BLACKHOLING VISIBILITY
In this section we assess to what extent our analysis can infer black-
holing activity using a number of public and private datasets and
we discuss factors that determine visibility into BGP blackholing.
5.1 Visibility across Datasets
To assess the visibility of blackholing activity of the 307 ISPs and
IXPs that are included in our blackhole communities dictionary, we
rely on the four large BGP datasets introduced in Section 3. For RIPE
RIS and Route Views we utilize the BGPStream API [54] and for the
PCH and the CDN datasets we develop our own parser. We focus
on the period spanning August 2016 through March 2017, since it
includes time periods with high DDoS activity (see Section 6).
Table 3 provides summary statistics for each individual dataset as
well as the combined datasets. We ￿nd activity by more than 1,100
users, blackholing 88,381 pre￿xes. Out of these pre￿xes, 88,209 are
IPv4, which we focus on in the remainder of this analysis. It is worth
mentioning that 98% (86,834 of 88,209) IPv4 pre￿xes are /32 pre￿xes.
We ￿nd active blackholed pre￿xes for some 242 (79%) out of the 307
blackholing providers in our BGP communities dictionary. We do
not see blackholing activity for 24 small IXPs (out of the 49 IXPs in
our dictionary) and some small/regional ISP blackholing providers
with known blackholing communities.
Not all BGP datasets contribute evenly to the visibility of BGP
blackholing activity, as shown in Table 3. The CDN BGP dataset
contributes most blackholing activity and observes almost all active
blackholing providers. This is to be expected since it receives BGP
feeds from the largest number of peers (around 1K networks). Notice
that the number of visible blackholing providers is almost twice as
large as compared to any other BGP dataset, with 111 blackholing
providers that are only visible in the CDN dataset. With respect
to blackholing users, however, we note that the majority of them
are visible in multiple datasets. Nevertheless, each dataset observes
some 5-15% unique users. Here, the CDN again contributes the
largest share of unique users. In terms of visibility of blackholed
pre￿xes, both the CDN and the PCH dataset provide signi￿cantly
better coverage when compared to RIPE RIS and Route Views (some
70K+ blackholed pre￿xes in CDN/PCH versus some 25K pre￿xes in
RIPE RIS/Route Views). The underlying reason here is that the CDN
and PCH have deployed BGP monitors at various IXPs, where they
peer directly with the IXP’s route servers and hence provide direct
visibility into blackholing o￿ered by IXPs. When combining all the
datasets, PCH contributes the largest number of unique pre￿xes.
Nevertheless, RIS also contributes a large number of unique pre￿xes
due to a blackholing provider that peers directly with a RIS collector,
but with no other collector. Another factor that contributes to the
large diversity of visibility across and within our datasets is the
percentage of BGP feeds that individual BGP collectors receive
directly from a BGP blackholing provider, i.e., when a blackholing
provider has a direct BGP session with a BGP collector (See Table 3,
Blackholing providers with direct BGP feed). BGP datasets with a
large fraction of direct peerings, i.e., CDN and PCH datasets with
21% and 44% respectively, provide the best visibility.
In Table 4 we look across datasets and explore the business types
of networks associated with the blackholed entity, following the
same approach as with Table 2. A majority of the blackholed pre-
￿xes are tagged with transit/access blackhole communities, which
is expected since this type of networks serve the largest number of
customers and therefore have the largest pool of potential blackhol-
ing users. IXPs are the second largest type of blackholing providers,
mainly due to a few very large IXPs - such DE-CIX, Equinix, and
HK-IX - that serve many hundreds of AS members.
5.2 Limitations
We are well aware that our methodology relies on datasets that
have some limitations.
First, although we do our best to maintain and update the BGP
blackhole community dictionary, it is possible that we miss commu-
nity values for some blackholing providers. Moreover, the validation
of discovered BGP blackhole communities is a slow process if we
have to rely on private communication rather than o￿cial docu-
mentation, e.g., the o￿cial web page or the IRR records. Finally, it
is possible (but unlikely) that ASes change their BGP blackholing
communities or add additional ones. Maintaining an up-to-date
dictionary of communities presents a challenging task.
Second, we only observe pre￿xes whose blackholing announce-
ments are visible in the public Internet. Note that according to
RFC7999 [42] and RFC5635 [45], blackhole announcements must
not be propagated outside the local AS and should carry the no-
export community. Nonetheless, our ￿ndings suggest that these
recommendations are not respected by a number of networks, as we
present in Section 9. Some networks do not rely on BGP to trigger
blackholing, but provide specialized interfaces to their customers
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Source #Blackholing
providers
#Unique
bh. providers
#Blackholing
users
#Unique
bh. users
#Blackholed
pre￿xes
#Unique
bh. pre￿xes
Blackholing providers
with direct BGP feeds
CDN 231 111 894 94 73,400 5,908 20.8%
RIS 113 0 739 57 24,637 6,217 4.42%
RV 116 2 729 27 24,420 417 17.2%
PCH 119 5 831 63 74,709 7,224 43.6%
ALL 242 118 1,112 241 88,209 19,766 33.05%
Table 3: Blackhole dataset overview for IPv4 pre￿xes (August 2016 – March 2017).
Network Type #Bh. prov. #Bh. users #Bh. pref. Direct feed
Transit/Access 184 986 80,262 28%
IXP 25 673 20,824 100%
Content Provider 19 90 2,428 21%
Enterprise 5 127 4,144 20%
Educ./Res./NfP 5 40 1,244 20%
unknown 4 19 882 0%
Total (unique) 242 1,112 88,209 33.8%
Table 4: Blackhole visibility of IPv4 pre￿xes (August 2016 –
March 2017).
to request a pre￿x to be blackholed. For example, Cogent uses an
interface that requires login and password by other networks or
authorities to blackhole pre￿xes [20]. In February 2017, the black-
holing of two CloudFlare IP addresses hosting Pirate Bay content
received some attention [67]. The corresponding pre￿xes were not
visible in any of our BGP datasets. However, by querying a BGP
looking glass within Cogent, we were able to observe it. Hence,
looking glasses have the potential to reveal additional blackholing
that is invisible in BGP data.
Third, while we are using multiple BGP datasets and a large
number of collectors (see Section 3), it is possible that a blackholing
announcement that was in fact advertised in the public Internet is
not observed at any of our collectors. This is the case if the collector
does not directly peer with a BGP blackholing provider, or if a
BGP blackholing provider strips blackhole communities or does
not propagate the route to its peers, customers, or providers.
Summary: We conclude that even though our datasets have
some limitations with regards to where the BGP collectors are lo-
cated, and with whom and how they peer, they unveil blackholing
activity for a large number of blackholing providers and users that
are included in the blackhole communities dictionary. With regards
to blackholed pre￿xes, the numbers are multiple times higher than
reported previously [25, 54]. Nevertheless, this study provides a
lower bound regarding the number of blackholing providers, black-
holing users, and blackholed pre￿xes.
6 THE RISE OF BGP BLACKHOLING
To explore the extent to which BGP blackholing has been adopted
by network operators, we apply our methodology to several large
BGP datasets (see Section 3) from December 2014 till March 2017.
We only report IPv4 data since the number of blackholed IPv6
pre￿xes is less than 1% of the total during this period.
Blackholing Adoption: To understand the longitudinal trends
with regards to adoption, we show in Figure 4(a) the number of ac-
tive blackholing providers per day that are visible across all datasets.
We ￿nd that the number of blackholing providers has more than
doubled during this period (from 40 per day in December 2014 to
up to 100 in early 2017). At the same time, the number of routed
transit ASes, i.e., ASes that carry tra￿c between at least two di￿er-
ent other ASes and are hence possible blackholing providers, has
increased only by 18%. Over the entire measurement period, we
were able to identify 270 blackholing providers. Next, we turn our
attention to blackholing users, see Figure 4(b). Here, the increase
is even higher. Indeed, the daily blackholing user population has
increased by a factor of 4 since December 2014, peaking up to 400
in early 2017. This increase again outpaces the 21% increase of all
the visibly routed ASes in the public routing data. Over the entire
measurement period, we were able to identify 1,461 blackholing
users. Even more striking is the increase in the number of pre￿xes
over time. As shown in Figure 4(c), the daily number of pre￿xes
increased from about 500 at the end of 2014 to over 3,000 in early
2017 and peaking over 5,000. The increased usage underlines the
value of BGP-based blackholing for ISPs. Over the entire measure-
ment period we were able to identify 161,031 blackholed pre￿xes
i.e., a factor of 20 times higher than previously reported blackhol-
ing activity [25]. This is possible since our methodology does not
depend on private vantage points but can be applied on publicly
available BGP feeds from many di￿erent BGP peers.
Blackholing Activity Spikes: A closer look at the daily BGP
blackholing activity shows that in addition to the constant increase
in all three usage metrics, namely, number of blackholing providers,
blackholing users, and blackholed pre￿xes, there are signi￿cant
spikes. Manual investigation of the most noticeable spikes shows
that they correlate well with large-scale cyber-attacks, especially
with DDoS attacks, which made headlines in the press. This sug-
gests that such attacks contribute to the rapid adoption of BGP
blackholing as a mitigation technique.
In particular, we were able to correlate some of the most notice-
able spikes in blackholing activity with well-documented DDoS
attacks, which we annotate in Figure 4(c). Spike (B) on 2016/05/16
coincides with a large ampli￿cation attack against NS1, a major
DNS provider with global footprint [5]. Spike (C) on 2016/07/15
occurred during the Turkish coup attempt which was accompanied
by DDoS attacks against several news sites [63]. During spike (D)
on 2016/08/22, DDoS attacks that peaked at 540 Gbps targeted the
Rio Olympic games [68]. At the beginning of September 2017 we
noticed a signi￿cant increase in the level of blackholing activity
that lasted for months and correlated with the operation of the
Mirai botnet [4]. The spike (E) correlates with the “Krebs on Se-
curity” attack [44] that started around 2016/09/20 and lasted for
days. Spike (F) correlates with the massive attack against Liberia’s
Internet infrastructure on 2016/10/31 that is also related to the Mirai
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(a) Blackholing providers per day. (b) Blackholing users per day. (c) Blackholed pre￿xes per day.
Figure 4: Longitudinal growth of blackholing usage.
botnet [66]. We con￿rm that most of the remaining spikes in the
￿rst nine months of 2015 also correlate well with large scale DDoS
attacks on corporate websites. An important observation is that
the magnitude of the spike in blackholing activity depends on the
number of blackholed pre￿xes, as well as the blackholing strategy
of the users, i.e., whether they decide to blackhole individual IP
addresses or entire pre￿xes. Thus, the magnitude of the spike alone
can not be an indicator of how large an attack is.
We note that while we observe correlations across the number
of blackholed pre￿xes and DDoS attacks, we can not readily de-
termine whether the increase in blackholed pre￿xes is indeed the
result of DDoS attacks taking place at the same time. We also ￿nd
instances of accidental blackholing events, such as the spike (A) on
2016/04/18. This spike seems to be unrelated to a DDoS attack, but
rather the result of a miscon￿guration where a European academic
network accidentally blackholed its entire routing table for less
than 2 minutes. In future work, we plan to assess the causality
between DDoS attacks and blackholing events.
7 BGP BLACKHOLING PROVIDERS
Next, we ask who and where are the BGP blackholing providers
again focusing on the time period August 2016 to March 2017 (Ta-
ble 4) . We start by grouping the observed blackholing providers
according to their network type following the same technique as
Section 4.1. As one might expect, most blackholing providers, 184
out of 242, are transit/access providers. This group has signi￿cant
incentives for providing such services to their customers. They can
reduce their own tra￿c by not forwarding the “unwanted” cus-
tomer tra￿c. This group includes many large transit and Tier-1
providers. Consequently, the number of blackholing users using
these blackholing providers is also the largest, 986 combined users
out of 1,112. Similarly, the number of IPv4 pre￿xes that are black-
holed via the transit/access providers accounts for about 90% of the
total number of pre￿xes (80,262 out of 88,209).
IXPs are the second largest group of blackholing providers, of-
fering blackholing to 60% of the total observed users and 25% of
the total observed blackholed pre￿xes, although they account for
“only” 25 out of 242 (10.3%) observed blackholing providers. That
IXPs have a relatively greater proportion of blackholing users and
pre￿xes is due, at least partially, to the IXPs in our dataset all con-
tributing direct feeds to an available BGP collector, and therefore
they o￿er good visibility in their blackholing activity. Moreover,
most IXPs that o￿er blackholing service have a signi￿cant number
of member ASes, often in the order of hundreds, which explains
why the number of blackholing users that rely on the IXP blackhol-
ing service is the second largest among all the types of blackholing
providers.
Although blackholing providers that are content providers are
about as numerous as IXPs, they have a relatively small number of
blackholing users and blackholed pre￿xes. Enterprise and unknown
type blackholing providers are a small group with relatively small
numbers of blackholing users and blackholed pre￿xes. For these we
have limited direct feeds to our collectors, which also limits their
visibility. To better understand how blackholing providers are used,
we plot in Figure 5(a) the CDF of the number of blackholed pre￿xes
for each of the blackholing providers separately for transit/access
network provider and IXPs. We observe that the number of black-
holed pre￿xes associated with transit/access networks ranges from
a few to more than 1,000, and only 20 are associated with more
than 1,000 blackholed pre￿xes. The CDF for the IXP group (recall
it only has 25 members) roughly follows that for the transit/access
providers. But is more extreme at each end: about 20% have just one
blackholed pre￿x, as compared with 15%; and 14% have more than
1,000 blackholed pre￿xes. Next, we identify to which region each
blackholing provider belongs to, see Figure 6(a), using the country
registered in the RIR of each AS. Most blackholing providers are
in Russia, USA, and Germany. IXPs that provide blackholing ser-
vices are in major cities which are also telecommunication hubs,
particularly in Europe, USA, and Asia.
8 BGP BLACKHOLING USERS
Next, we focus on the observed blackholing users and the pro￿le
of blackholed pre￿xes. Figure 6(b) is the counterpart of Figure 6(a)
for the blackholing users. It highlights similarities and di￿erences.
Again the largest group is in Russia, US, and Germany, but other
countries including Brazil and Ukraine are in the top-5. Figure 5(b)
shows the CDF of the blackholing users vs. the number of black-
holed pre￿xes (in log scale), for the period August 2016 to March
2017. Content providers are by far the most active group in terms of
blackholed pre￿xes. While content providers account only for some
18% of the total blackholing users, they originate 43% of the black-
holed pre￿xes. This con￿rms expectations, since content providers
host servers that can potentially targets of attacks. Manual investi-
gation shows that the large majority of these providers are small
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Figure 5: CDF: #blackholed pre￿xes per (a) blackholing provider and (b) blackholing user type.
1 45
(a)
1 189
(b)
Figure 6: #blackholing (a) provider ASes and (b) user ASes per country.
cloud providers and hosters and their top-5 locations are: Russia
(46), US (30), Germany (21), Ukraine (18) and Poland (10).
Services/Applications on Blackholed IPs:Next, we are inter-
ested in application-layer characteristics of the blackholed pre￿xes
or, more speci￿cally, the IP addresses covered by blackholed pre￿xes.
Initially, we focus on March 2017 with 20,948 blackholed pre￿xes,
which include 20,088 host routes (/32s) and cover a total of 5.2M
unique IPv4 addresses. To determine which applications/services
are o￿ered by blackholed hosts, we take advantage of the Internet-
wide scanning data as provided by scans.io [10, 27] for several
protocols/port numbers, including TCP-SYN scans for HTTP(S),
SSH, Telnet, FTP, SMTP(S), POP3(S), and IMAP(S) and UDP scan
data for DNS and NTP.
We identi￿ed o￿ered services, or more precisely, open host ports
for more than 60% of the blackholed pre￿xes, see Figure 7(a). The
classes are not mutually exclusive, since a host can o￿er multiple
services. Overall, HTTP is the dominant service (53% of pre￿xes)
and more than 90% (79%) of the FTP (SSH) servers are co-located
with HTTP servers. This corresponds to the default con￿guration of
hosters o￿ering precon￿gured virtualized Web servers. Moreover,
we ￿nd that hosts in some 10% of the blackholed pre￿xes o￿er all 6
mail-related protocols. Hosts in 845 blackholed pre￿xes (some 4%)
accept TCP connections on all of the 10 tested protocols, suggesting
that these hosts might be tarpits [3].
Web Servers and Content: Given the large number of possible
blackholed Web servers we next explore which content they host
based on the results of an HTTP GET request to the respective IP
addresses – data also provided by scans.io. We ￿nd that only 61% of
the blackholed IP addresses reply with an HTTP response, while
the general response rate is roughly 90% (for the entire population
of HTTP servers). Thus, a signi￿cant share of blackholed hosts
run some service on port 80 other than Web. In future work, we
plan to explore this in more detail. Next, we explore which con-
tent the blackholed Web servers may host using the DNS lookups
for Alexa top 1M domain names, also from scans.io. While useful,
the dataset is limited by the fact that the vantage point is a single
location at the University of Michigan and, thus, we might miss
some Domain-to-IP address mappings, e.g., for CDNs and other
distributed infrastructures. In total, we ￿nd that only 334 black-
holed pre￿xes (about 3% of HTTP hosts) host Web sites that are
among the Alexa top 1M. This suggests that many of these Web
servers are active and reachable, but do not host the typical popular
content. This has to be expected since many Alexa top sites rely
on CDNs and other large content hosters to provide reliable scal-
able services. Among the top domains are 51auto.com (rank 2282),
ebrun.com (rank 3044), imooc.com (rank 3148), and gdz.ru (rank
5199). Among the most dominant TLDs are .com (38% of domains),
followed by .ru (16%), .org (11.9%), .net (6%), and .se (3%). We
con￿rmed our ￿ndings using data from DNSDB [29], a proprietary
database with a list of active domains per IP for a speci￿ed period.
Malicious Activity of Blackholed IPs: Typically, blackholing
is used when a blackholed pre￿x is the victim of a DDoS attack.
However, we ￿nd incidents when blackholed addresses–a minority
of the overall–engage in suspicious activity. For this analysis we use
proprietary information that characterizes the source activity of IPs.
In particular, we use IP-level information for (i) port scanners, i.e.,
IPs that perform port scans against a major CDN, (ii) vulnerability
probes, i.e., IPs that scan multiple CDN servers for a speci￿c port,
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and (iii) IPs that participate in repeated login attempts against CDN
customers. This information is used, in part, in features of the Kona
Site Defender service [2]. On a daily basis we ￿nd between 400 to
900 matches for blackholed pre￿xes in this database. More than
90% of these IPs are probers. The remaining ones are scanners and
about 2% did both. Moreover, on a daily basis about 500 to 800
IPs in the blackholed pre￿xes participated in unauthorized login
attempts. The union of all of the above IPs belong to about 2% of
the blackholed pre￿xes.
9 BGP BLACKHOLING PRACTICES
Next, we explore common practices on the use of BGP blackholing
for the period August 2016 to March 2017.
Global vs. Local Blackholing: Today, ASes peer at multiple
locations and/or have multiple upstream providers, either for re-
silience or for cost e￿ciency [28, 34]. Many networks are also
members at multiple IXPs [35, 43]. Thus, ASes can choose to use
one or more of them as blackholing provider. Indeed, we can expect
that during an attack a pre￿x is blackholed using multiple blackhol-
ing providers. We consider a blackholing event to be the blackholing
of a pre￿x at one or at multiple providers concurrently (or within a
small time window).
Figure 7(b) shows a histogram of the number of blackholing
providers associated with a blackholed pre￿x for each blackhole
event (y-axis in log scale). Note: a given pre￿x could be counted in
multiple bins, for example if it ever were blackholed by just one
provider, and another time was blackholed by, say, three providers.
A signi￿cant fraction of pre￿xes, 28%, are associated with multiple
blackholing providers, 2% are associatedwithmore than 10 blackhol-
ing providers. The largest number of blackholing providers across
our BGP datasets is 20. Note that the actual number of blackholing
events with multiple blackholing providers may be even higher
given the visibility restrictions of blackholed pre￿xes that are not
advertised with bundled communities, as explained in Section 4.2.
BGP Blackholing Propagation: The majority of the blackhole
announcements are for host routes (/32s). Pre￿xes that are more
speci￿c than /24 are typically not accepted and not propagated
by BGP. However, according to RFC7999 and RFC5635 [42, 45],
blackhole announcements for more-speci￿c pre￿xes should be ac-
cepted to enable blackholing for speci￿c hosts, without a￿ecting
the reachability of large address spaces. Nonetheless, as explained
in Section 5.2, the same RFCs require that the propagation of these
pre￿xes outside the local AS must be suppressed.
We investigate the propagation patterns of blackholed pre￿xes
by checking the position of the blackholing provider in the AS path
in the BGP data2. Figure 7(c) shows that in the most common case
(about 50%) the blackholing provider does not appear in the path and
we are able to detect the blackholing activity thanks to the bundling
of blackholing communities, see Section 4.2. In about 20% of the
blackholing events the collector is on an IXP that is a blackholing
provider, we annotate this as 0 AS distance. In more than 10% of
the blackholing events the collector is directly peering with the
blackholing provider, denoted 1 AS distance. Nevertheless, in 30%
of the cases we observe that the blackholed pre￿x is propagated at
least one hop away from the blackholing provider, 1 - 6 AS distance.
2We only test this for BGP blackhole communities that are associated with a single AS.
BGP Blackholing Duration Patterns: To understand the tem-
poral dynamics of BGP blackholing, Figure 8(a) shows the CDF
of the duration of each blackhole event (ungrouped) for August
2016 to March 2017. Hereby, the blackhole duration refers to the
time between the start (announcement) and end (implicit or explicit
withdrawal, see Section 4.2) of a blackholed pre￿x. Over 70% of
the blackhole events have a duration of one minute or less, which
may seem surprisingly short. However, when we group together
events for the same pre￿x using a 5 minute timeout (assuming that
the collector infrastructure is su￿ciently closely synchronized),
then just 4% of the (grouped) events are this short. This shows that
a signi￿cant number of events, by these accounts more than 70%
(5 minutes bin aggregation), have an ON/OFF pattern. While this
looks strange at ￿rst, private communication with a number of
blackholing users con￿rms this is a best practice. An awkwardness
of using blackholing is the inability to know when an attack is over.
Thus, it is a common practice to blackhole, e.g., a host, observe
a drop in tra￿c, then withdraw the blackholing to check if the
attack is over. If not, the process is repeated. This allows operators
to reduce the impact of an attack while limiting its operational
disruption.
Figure 8(a) also highlights that a minority of the events are rather
long: 2% of the ungrouped events and 30% of the grouped events
are longer than 16 hours. Figure 8(b) shows the histogram of the
duration of the ungrouped events (x-axis in hours, y-axis log scale).
We observe roughly three event regimes: short-lived (minutes), long-
lived (weeks), and very long-lived (months). Manual investigation
shows that some long and very long-lived events are either due to
miscon￿guration or intentional blocking of IPs with bad reputation.
We do not (yet) have a general methodology to explain all instances
of long-lasting blackholed pre￿xes.
10 BGP BLACKHOLING EFFICACY
To assess the impact of BGP blackholing on network reachability
and tra￿c, we use active and passivemeasurements collected during
and after blackholing events.
Assessment using Active Measurements: To assess the data
plane reachability of the blackholed pre￿xes, we orchestrated tracer-
oute measurements to the blackholed pre￿xes. We utilize BGP-
Stream [54] to obtain a near real-time BGP stream from all the RIPE
RIS and RouteViews collectors, and upon detecting a new blackhol-
ing event, we select 40 probes from the RIPE Atlas platform [61].
To obtain a diverse set of probes, for each blackholing event
we request ten probes for each one of the following four groups:
probes in the downstream cone of the blackholing user, probes in
the upstream cone, probes accessible through peering links and
probes inside the blackholing user AS, according to CAIDA’s AS
relationship inferences [48]. We then select 4 probes (uniformly at
random) from each group. If a group doesn’t have enough probes
we select the remaining probes randomly. For the traceroute target
we select a host inside each blackholed pre￿x. We also select a non-
blackholed target from the most speci￿c pre￿x that includes the
blackholed pre￿x, in order to compare their respective data plane
reachability. For instance, if the blackholing pre￿x length is 32, we
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Figure 7: Distribution of (a) services run on blackhole hosts (aggregated per blackhole pre￿x), (b)# blackholing providers per
BGP blackholing event, and (c) histogram of AS-distance between BGP collector and blackholing provider (No-path means
that the blackholing provider is not in the AS path).
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Figure 8: (a) CDF: Durations of blackholing events (Ungrouped) and periods (Grouped, using 5 minute timeout) and (b) his-
togram of blackholing events duration.
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Figure 9: Histogram of impact of blackholing on (a) IP-level and (b) AS-level paths for /32 blackholed hosts, and (c) levels for
blackholed (negative y-axis) and non-blackholed tra￿c (positive y-axis) to blackholed pre￿xes.
select another target in the same /31 if possible3. For each target
we execute two traceroute queries from the same probe, one while
the blackholing event is active, and a follow-up measurement one
hour after we detect the withdrawal of the blackholing. In total we
collected traceroute paths for 2,967 blackholing events involving
337 blackholing users during March 2017. Our ￿ndings indicate
that blackholing is e￿ective. The reachability of the blackholed host
decreases signi￿cantly, by an average of 5.9 IP-level hops when
3Sometimes there are separate BGP announcements for blackholed /32 pre￿xes that are
in the same /31, or /30. In this case the neighbor is chosen from the next less-speci￿c
pre￿x that includes the blackholed host and at least one non-blackholed one.
comparing the paths to the blackholed host during and after the
blackholing.
Next, we study where on the path, during blackholing, the tra￿c
is dropped in the sense of how far away from the destination, see
Figure 9(a). Here, we only consider events where the destinationwas
reachable again after the blackholing event to eliminate artifacts
due to route changes, miscon￿gurations, and ICMP blocking which
limits traceroute reachability [59]. We include two comparisons: (1)
The ￿rst (red solid line) shows the di￿erence in traced path lengths
after vs. during the blackhole event for a given RIPE Atlas probe.
The “path length” is the number of hops to the last responding
interface on the trace. (2) Likewise, the second (blue-dashed line)
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shows the path length di￿erence to the neighboring non-blackholed
host vs. the blackholed host during the blackholing event. Both
comparisons highlight that blackholing is successful. More than
80% of the paths to the blackholed hosts terminate earlier during
the blackholing event than after the blackholing event. For about
15% of the cases the path to the blackholed host is of equal length or
shorter. This can occur if (a) the pre￿x is not blackholed by utilizing
all the providers, (b) not all providers o￿er blackholing, (c) BGP
miscon￿gurations, (d) route changes, or even (e) inconsistency in
the responding interface, e.g., due to load balancing.
We use the same data to study the impact on the length of the AS-
level path, where, likewise, the “AS-level path length” is the number
of ASes on the path to the last responding interface on the trace, see
Figure 9(b). Overall, we see a signi￿cant shortening of the AS-level
path, on average 2 to 4 AS-hops, during vs. after the blackholing
event. This ￿nding con￿rms our observation from the analysis of
the control-plane paths, that in many cases the blackholing request
is propagated along the AS path. We also observe that in 16% of the
cases the tra￿c to the destination is dropped at the destination AS
or the upstream provider. Therefore, if blackholing is used and de-
ployed at scale it is possible to signi￿cantly reduce unwanted/attack
tra￿c in the Internet, especially for long lasting large-scale DDoS
attacks. Lastly, we observe that for blackholed pre￿xes less speci￿c
than /24 we ￿nd virtually no di￿erence between the path lengths,
when comparing the paths during and after the blackholing events
and between the blackholed and non-blackholed hosts. This ￿nding
indicates that operators respect, to a large extent, the requirement
to blackhole pre￿xes only more speci￿c than /24.
Assessment using PassiveMeasurements:To validate our in-
ferences we collaborate with major blackholing providers: IXPs in
the USA, Central and South Europe. First, we validate the complete-
ness of the visibility of our BGP datasets regarding the blackholed
pre￿xes at each of the IXPs.We con￿rm that we have 99.5% visibility
of all blackholing events that involve the IXPs route server. We also
con￿rm that the large majority of blackholed pre￿xes are IPv4 /32s.
Next, we check the impact on tra￿c. Therefore, we use IPFIX [17]
tra￿c traces collected from the switching fabric of a major Euro-
pean IXP, which o￿ers a blackholing service. The traces, sampled at
a rate of 1 out of 10K packets, provide ￿ow-level information about
the source/destination IP, port, and exchanged tra￿c volume via
the IXP infrastructure on a per IXP member basis. To understand
if and how much tra￿c is discarded, we focus on the blackholed
pre￿xes with the largest tra￿c volumes at the IXP (these pre￿xes
are blackholed throughout the week). Figure 9(c) shows the tra￿c
volume in two stacked plots across one week. The values below
the zero line are the tra￿c that is dropped at the IXP while the
ones on top of the zero line show the tra￿c still traversing the IXP
to its destination. We observe that a signi￿cant amount, i.e., more
than 50% of tra￿c for some of the successfully announced /32s is
dropped (negative part). Nevertheless, some tra￿c still is forwarded
via the IXP towards the destination4. A closer analysis regarding the
tra￿c sources reveals that 80% comes from less than ten member
ASes. Apparently, they do not honor the correctly announced BGP
blackhole route. Looking into the IXP’s route server logs points
out two reasons: (a) some ASes do not accept /32 announcements
4We do not know if it reaches the destination.
because they have not yet changed their router con￿gurations ap-
propriately, (b) other ASes do not use the route server and, thus,
miss the announcement.
To complement our ￿ndings we focus on pre￿xes that are black-
holed on the control plane (announced to the route server) but for
which we observe no reduction on the data plane (red region in
Figure 9(c)). Our analysis shows that a common reason is miscon-
￿guration at the blackholing user: (a) the blackholing user must
maintain proper entries within the RIR/veri￿cation database that is
used to ￿lter incoming announcements at IXPs—the blackholing
provider. The route servers will only redistribute pre￿xes to other
peers if the advertising AS is authorized to announce this pre￿x,
(b) some announcements are miscon￿gured in the sense that they
either carry invalid next hop IPs or wrong BGP communities.
We con￿rm this ￿nding for other ASes by analyzing all black-
holed /32 pre￿xes for one day. Of 508 ASes that send tra￿c to these
IPs, for only about one third of these ASes, tra￿c is dropped for at
least one of the blackholed IPs. Note, this is a lower bound. During
large-scale DDoS attacks even networks that do not use the route
server discard tra￿c to DDoS victims, indicating that blackholing
is also used over bilateral peering sessions. Overall, we con￿rm that
blackholing can be e￿cient if con￿gured according to best com-
mon practices. However, we also ￿nd room for improvement. We
strongly encourage operators to update their BGP con￿gurations to
accept advertised pre￿xes more speci￿c than /24 and blackholing
users to maintain proper RIR/veri￿cation database entries.
11 IMPLICATIONS
Implications to Network Troubleshooting: Our methodology
of studying the BGP unreachable signals due to blackholing al-
lows us to infer reachability problems of a destination solely based
on control plane-data, including the root cause—useful for trou-
bleshooting reachability. This is in contrast to previous work which
combined active and passive measurements for investigation of
unreachability of pre￿xes in the Internet [40, 41]. Our methodology
can also accurately estimate when a pre￿x starts to be unreachable
via the data plane, again by monitoring the control plane only. Such
insights are also important for regulatory authorities which need
to understand reachability issues. Since our methodology can also
identify unconventional use of BGP blackholing, it has the potential
to reveal censorship by entities that restrict access to information.
Implications for Reputation: An important asset of network
operators, cloud/hosters, and cloud tenants is the reputation of their
IP address space. Our methodology enables potential customers to
check to which degree the IPs of a provider are repeatedly black-
holed. However, our results di￿er from other reputation systems
as we have information about the targets rather than the sources
of problematic tra￿c. On the one hand the use of blackholing indi-
cates that the provider is able to tackle DDoS attacks. On the other
hand it might be indicative of customers with frequently attacked
services, mis-con￿gurations, or other mis-management. Moreover,
the blackholing may also be caused by a third party. In the case
of unauthorized blackholing (via pre￿x hijacking) it is possible to
determine the blackholing provider and start an investigation. For
cloud services, BGP blackholing may be problematic as all applica-
tions that use the same shared IP will be blocked. Thus, potential
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customers may shy away from providers with IP address space
that is too frequently blackholed. Indeed, ongoing work investi-
gates ￿ne-grained blackholing, where additional restrictions, such
as a given port number, are imposed [14, 24]. Thus, our tools and
analysis of blackholing activity can be used to enhance existing
reputation systems, e.g., IP reputation based on previous malicious
activity.
Need for Standardization: Unfortunately, there is no strict
convention for BGP communities. Yet, a recent initiative for stan-
dardizing a BGP blackhole community [42] is already adopted by
a large majority of the IXPs and some of the ISPs. This points out
that standardization is feasible and that operators do adopt. With
“standardized” BGP blackhole communities, the corresponding BGP
con￿guration is simpli￿ed and, thus, usage should increase while
the risk of miscon￿guration decreases. It is important to establish
best common practices, e.g., strategies on targeted use of blackhol-
ing that mitigates the negative impact on legitimate tra￿c, or on
how to validate BGP blackholing announcements, and guidelines
regarding the size of the blackholed pre￿x. The latter is needed to
reduce misuse and unintentional mis-con￿guration of BGP black-
holing which can result in large-scale reachability problems.
12 CONCLUSION
In this paper we provide the ￿rst Internet-wide study of the state
and adoption of a popular attack-mitigation technique, BGP black-
holing. We develop a methodology to infer BGP blackholing based
on BGP announcements and BGP community tags, which enables
a signi￿cant increase in the visibility of the provider and user net-
works of this capability.
Our study shows that the documented increase of cyber-attacks
and threats in the Internet has signi￿cantly increased the adoption
of BGP blackholing. The number of blackholing providers has more
than doubled the last three years. Our analysis shows that, today,
more than 300 networks, including about 50 IXPs, worldwide o￿er
blackholing as a service to their customers, peers, and members
respectively. Even more impressive is the rise in the number of
blackholing users and the number of blackholed pre￿xes. During
the last three years, the number of blackholing users has increased
fourfold and the number of blackholed pre￿xes has increased six-
fold, peaking up to 400 blackholing users and up to 5K blackholed
pre￿xes per day, respectively, in recent months. Along with the
steady increase of BGP blackholing adoption, our study identi￿es
spikes that correlate well with large-scale DDoS attacks. We also
show that BGP blackholing delivers on the promise of dropping the
unwanted tra￿c early saving, typically by two or three AS-hops and
multiple IP-hops. Thus, blackholing is readily available, cheap, and
e￿ective at attack-mitigation and reducing tra￿c on intermediate
networks, and has already been widely adopted. However, blackhol-
ing also discards legitimate tra￿c, and can have the drawback that
the target becomes unreachable – the goal of the DDoS attack. Also,
if the target organization has purchased a tra￿c-scrubbing ser-
vice, then this service is degraded if the tra￿c is discarded prior to
reaching the scrubbing center. Hence there is a con￿ict of interests
between organizations that use such a service, and intermediate
networks through which the tra￿c would traverse. The negative
impact of blackholing is less severe if (much of) the attack tra￿c
originates from only a few locations and blackholing is limited
to the associated providers. We ￿nd from our passive measure-
ments that blackholing can be even more e￿ective if all operators
would follow best common practices. Best common practices are
in need to minimize the negative externalities of BGP blackholing,
i.e., mitigate the impact on legitimate tra￿c. We believe that our
study provides insights to potential providers and users of BGP
blackholing and develops tools to better study reachability issues in
the Internet, improve troubleshooting, increase transparency, and
inform peering and hosting decisions.
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